Freedom and Sovereignty Initiative Europe

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Burnham wants Britain to rethink Europe. Here are eight things UK voters are not being told.

As the Prime Minister arrives for Friday’s UK–EU summit, Freedom and Sovereignty Initiative Europe sets out how the EU has changed since 2016, and why it has changed for the worse.

BRUSSELS, 19 November 2026 – Andy Burnham comes to Brussels on Friday 20 November for a UK–EU summit, days after telling the country that Brexit has not delivered. He has promised a ‘national conversation’ on Britain’s long-term relationship with the bloc and has suggested that applying to rejoin could become an option later. Freedom and Sovereignty Initiative Europe (FSI Europe), the Brussels expert think tank launched by the team behind MCC Brussels, today sets out what British voters are not being told about the club they are being invited to reconsider.

The summit is expected to seal a food and drink deal, agreements on energy and emissions trading and a youth mobility scheme. Until the next election, the Prime Minister remains bound by Keir Starmer’s pledge not to rejoin the single market or the customs union. The direction of travel is clear all the same.

Mr Burnham is entitled to say that Brexit has disappointed. Plenty of Leave voters would agree that ‘take back control’ has not been delivered. But the case for going back rests on a picture of the EU that is a decade out of date. The Union on offer in 2026 is not the one Britain voted on. It is clearly worse.

1. The EU is less democratic than the one Britain left. Brussels has turned Article 122, a treaty clause meant for emergencies, into a routine way of legislating without the elected Parliament. It underpinned the €750 billion recovery fund and, on 27 May 2025, SAFE, a €150 billion defence loan instrument adopted with MEPs shut out. Even the Socialist group’s legal affairs coordinator accused von der Leyen of ‘a clear strategy of consolidating power within the EU Executive’. In May 2025, the EU’s own General Court ruled against the Commission over her withheld text messages with Pfizer’s chief executive. Across Europe, democracy is being attacked and the EU is silent, or complicit: Romania cancelled elections, Poland is using the police to take over top courts, Hungary banned opposition figures from running, and French and German authorities are engaged in lawfare against the main opposition parties. The EU itself is sanctioning parliamentary groups. FSI Europe’s first report, The EU’s Deep State by Senior Research Fellow Thomas Fazi, to be published soon, argues that no election anywhere in the EU can remove the permanent bureaucracy that runs it. Britain voted to leave a system where power sat too far from voters. Since then, power has moved further away.

2. The terms would be worse. According to FSI Europe’s own calculation, based on the Council’s current negotiating box for the 2028–2034 budget, a returning Britain would pay a gross £34–41 billion a year and a net £24–29 billion, roughly double what it paid before. In 2020, its last year as a member, Britain’s gross contribution of £22.2 billion was cut to £17 billion by the rebate Margaret Thatcher secured in 1984. A further £4.5 billion came back through EU schemes, leaving a net bill of around £12.5 billion. Around £3 billion a year, some £21 billion over the seven years, would go on repaying NextGenerationEU, the Covid recovery fund from which Britain received nothing. Some in Brussels are already counting on the money. ‘Burnham needs Europe and we need cash,’ according to one EU diplomat. ‘It should be a simple transaction. Britain gets access to our markets, we get urgently needed contributions to Europe’s poorer regions. Burnham is a new resource for us. Win, win.’ Nor would Britain get its old terms back. As a member, it had opt-outs from the euro and Schengen; a new applicant can expect neither. Whether the bill would be softened by a rebate is an open question. The negotiating box leaves even the existing corrections in square brackets. Sir Julian King, Britain’s last European Commissioner, has warned that rejoining would almost certainly mean giving up Thatcher’s rebate. Any discount would depend on Mr Burnham winning back at the negotiating table what Thatcher won in 1984, and doing so while asking to be let back in. That is a weaker hand than she ever held.

3. The EU’s borders are wide open, and Britain would share the vulnerability. EU countries granted citizenship to about 1.2 million people in 2024, 54.5 per cent more than in 2014, and every new citizen gains the right to live and work across the Union. Spain’s amnesty for people living there illegally closed on 30 June with 1,174,978 applications, more than double the government’s forecast of about 500,000. A residence permit is not a passport. But Latin Americans, who made up more than half the applicants, can apply for Spanish citizenship after two years rather than the usual ten. Then came Ceuta, where at least 60,000 people crossed into a territory of 80,000 over several days in July. Spain votes on 29 November, and Ceuta is a central campaign issue.

4. Europe’s industrial engine has stalled. Germany’s economy shrank in 2023 and 2024 and grew by 0.2 per cent in 2025. EY estimates that German industry cut around 124,000 jobs last year, about 50,000 of them in car-making, and the Commission expects manufacturing job losses to continue. Since the Brexit referendum, Britain has outgrown both. Its economy is 14.7 per cent larger than in the second quarter of 2016, against 12.6 per cent for France and just 8.0 per cent for Germany. Spain has done better still, and some economists argue that Britain would have grown faster inside the EU. But Mr Burnham’s claim that Britain has ‘lost more than we’ve gained’ is hard to square with an economy that has pulled ahead of Europe’s two largest.

5. Europe’s debt crisis would become Britain’s. France is where the strain shows most, but it is not alone. The French finance ministry expects public debt to reach a record 119.3 per cent of GDP this year and nearly 122 per cent in 2027. Fitch downgraded France in 2025, and Paris now pays more to borrow than Rome. Greece and Italy owe more than 130 per cent of GDP, and the EU itself now borrows on a scale unthinkable in 2016: the €750 billion recovery fund, €150 billion of SAFE defence loans and a €90 billion loan to Ukraine are all financed by common EU debt. Inside the EU, none of this stays a national problem. A provision still under negotiation in the Council’s draft budget would let the Commission borrow up to €350 billion for crisis loans to member states, backed by a higher ceiling on what national treasuries can be called on to pay. If a heavily indebted member drew on those loans and could not repay, the others would stand behind them. A Britain that rejoined would potentially put its taxpayers on the hook for debts run up in Paris, Rome and Brussels.

6. Red tape has grown, not shrunk. Since 2016, Brussels has added the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, the AI Act, the carbon border levy and sweeping sustainability reporting and due diligence rules. The Draghi report found that around 60 per cent of EU firms see regulation as an obstacle to investment. The Commission now promises ‘simplification’ and, by its own count, is roughly halfway to its target. A machine that needs a dozen omnibus laws to undo its last ones has not changed its habits.

7. Unrest is spreading, and it has common roots. Since mid-September, France has seen more than 1,200 protests and riots, according to ACLED data. More than 500,000 people marched on 17 October, in some of the worst rioting in years. More than 6,500 people, most of them minors, were arrested in the first weeks, and 24 schools have been burned or ransacked. Police used water cannon in Frankfurt, Cologne and Hamburg on 31 October. The grievances are real: the cost of living, crumbling schools, a generation that sees no future. The common thread is governments that cannot control who arrives, cannot provide for those already here, and treat public anger as the problem. Britain has tensions of its own, and no reason to bind itself to governments failing at both.

8. Brussels is eroding free speech. The Commission’s ‘European Democracy Shield’, unveiled in November 2025, sets up a European Centre for Democratic Resilience, builds a network of ‘independent’ fact-checkers and backs ‘prebunking’, the practice of warning citizens off narratives before they encounter them. It sits on top of the Digital Services Act, under which ‘trusted flaggers’ can press platforms to remove or downrank content and the Commission can fine them up to 6 per cent of global turnover. It fined X €120 million last December. Presented as a shield for democracy, the Shield is becoming a shield against democracy itself. Britain’s Online Safety Act is no model. Rejoining would add a second, unelected layer on top.

Professor Frank Füredi, President of FSI Europe, said:

“To be sure, I am disappointed that Brexit’s tremendous promise for Britain has not been realised. But the failure of successive UK governments to make the most of the nation’s independence is not an argument against leaving the EU. On the contrary, it is an argument for more Brexit. Over the past decade the EU has gone from bad to worse. EU economies are running on empty and the institutions of Brussels are far less democratic than a decade ago.”

ENDS

Media enquiries: John O’Brien, Communications Director, john.obrien@fsieurope.org

Notes for editors

Freedom and Sovereignty Initiative Europe is an independent Brussels-based think tank led by Professor Frank Füredi. FSI Europe exists to make the case for a Europe of sovereign, secure and dynamic nation states and to support the patriotic movement with the ideas, arguments and reach it needs to win. It produces research, commentary and media examining the major political, cultural and economic challenges facing Europe, with a particular focus on national sovereignty, democratic accountability, freedom of expression and opposition to the centralisation of political power.

FSI Europe was launched by the team behind MCC Brussels. It is fully independent.

The budget figures are FSI Europe estimates based on the Council’s Negotiating Box for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034 (document 13922/26, 10 October 2026), in 2025 prices. Britain’s gross contribution is its share of combined EU and UK gross national income, about 16.9 per cent, applied to the negotiating box’s payment ceilings. The range covers a budget held at its EU27 size and one enlarged to keep the same share of national income. Net figures assume Britain regains its 2014–2020 share of pre-allocated funds, about 5.3 per cent, and a share of competitive funds in line with its past record. Loans and instruments outside the MFF ceilings are excluded.

Growth figures compare the second quarter of 2016 with the third quarter of 2026, using inflation-adjusted national statistics compiled by statistician Jamie Jenkins.